This article critiques our focus on possession as the cornerstone of theories of property, examining the limitations of possession both as a theoretical concept and as a practical one. Second, the article examines how an investment-based labor approach has sharply shaped our understandings of possession. By examining the intertwining of possession and labor during colonization, the article describes how the labor approach to possession excluded more communal corollaries and instilled in American property law a consistent push toward grounding land claims at the labor-possession nexus.
INTRODUCTION
Property is a first-order business. From overhead bins and elbow room on 1 airplanes to law student carrels, from sibling scuffles to the phantom boarder 3. Carrels have provided enough contentious debates in the past that many schools now use a lottery system to distribute carrels. See, e.g., Pence Law Library Carrel Policy, AM. U. WASH.
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[Vol. 50:517 syndrome that so frequently haunts the elderly, ordinary citizens obsess over 5 property on a daily basis. Theorists, on the other hand, obsess over possession. 6 Theories of property tend to focus on possession and to seek creation stories that explain the prevalence of first possession rules across cultures. This article questions that emphasis on first possession as the key moment for theorizing property and instead suggests that to the degree that we acknowledge the social nature of property arrangements, the key moment may come at the moment of dispossession-the moment that the second person attempts to take or use the property. 7 Cross-culturally, most children's fights involve property, as do most 8 delusions of the elderly suggesting the primal role of property in both our sense 9 of self and sense of security. We not only have the fundamental need for property that Carol Rose recognizes in her theory of personhood, but also a foundational 10 fear of dispossession. Dispossession is worth theorizing in property law and we largely have not done so.
The article proceeds along these lines: First, the article examines our reliance on the concept of possession and critiques that reliance, describing our many theoretical and practical difficulties in creating a settled definition. The failure of possession to yield a concrete and clear idea makes the concept vulnerable to serving as a proxy for something else, namely investments via labor. Next, the article engages the colonial history of the concept of possession to demonstrate how labor became so strongly tied into the American idea of possession. The article considers the investment-based labor approach and discusses how that approach morphed into a common law concept of possession that relied upon, but was rather untrue to, Locke's theories.
Notably, one of the greatest points of departure between the American possession-labor nexus and Locke's approach is the full emphasis on possession and the neglect of the corollary of dispossession. The article proceeds by considering how focusing on dispossession rather than possession would yield a different approach to property theory.
I. THE CORNERSTONE OF POSSESSION
W ithin the common law, possession stands as the "origin of property."
11
Grounded in principles of Roman law, which favored possession substantially, 12 the pairing of property and possession solidified during the colonial period as competing European powers challenged each other to articulate grounds for legal title to foreign territories. Indeed, the colonial enterprise may have woven deeply into the labor aspects of Locke's theories of property, which were attuned to the particular problems of claiming property in colonial lands.
13
When it came to territorial claims of European powers vis-à-vis each other, understandings of possession evolved as competing colonial powers articulated legal arguments that were consistent with their own legal cultures. Thus More than mere physical occupation, the British approach required the labors of planting or cultivation. Thus, when discussing African colonies, Vinogradoff 20 summarized the British approach as holding that not just "occupancy" was required but, specifically, occupation "for purposes of cultivation . . . [which] gives rise to a possessory right." Hedging no bets, Grotius declared that 21 "uncultivated land ought not to be considered as occupied."
22
British writers contrasted their settlements as "actual possessions" against the more imaginative or "paper" possessions claimed by Spain and Portugal by virtue of Papal proclamations. British writers scoffed at Spain's focus on the mining 23 15. Edmund Burke in his account of colonization describes that Columbus "was to take possession of the island in the name of their Catholic majesties, by setting up a cross upon the shore," which he did with "great multitudes of the inhabitants looking on, ignorant and unconcerned at a ceremony which was to deprive them of their natural liberty. 
II. FAILURES OF POSSESSION
Yet, for all the centrality of possession, both historically and theoretically, possession as a concept and practical matter proves remarkably difficult to pin down. We have invented a host of subordinate conceptions such as actual, real, and constructive possession, which are supposed to clarify the core idea, and yet we still struggle to conceptualize and implement possession within everyday case law.
One reason for the difficulty is simple: Real property is never truly possessed, at least not in the same sense that one naturally holds an object. At any one time, a person can physically touch a couple of square feet, or perhaps a bit more in interesting yoga poses or a game of Twister.
In case law, "actual" is one of many adjectives placed before possession in an effort to render the concept specific and tangible, when, in fact, the term is used in an imaginative or metaphorical fashion. Thus, for example, in the 33 famous case of Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., the court held that "oil and gas are not the property of any one until reduced to actual possession by extraction." Adjectives such as "actual" and "real," when placed before 34 "possession," implicitly acknowledge that possession itself is not enough. Even the "actual possession" so often discussed in Anglo-American case law is not actual. A person's things may occupy land and he may regularly visit or work upon larger portions of the land. He may build his fences, plant his crops, pasture his sheep, or establish a daily patrol. Yet at any given time, he is still limited to the few square feet occupied by his physical body.
Recently, a Massachusetts trial judge nicely framed the problem of possession in a jury instruction, explaining There are two kinds of possession, actual possession which is this glass capture.").
30 Because possession was being defined in terms of the social actions and land uses of the owners or purported owners, the nature of evidence sought had to be molded to the physical geography. The evidence of possession needed was that "required by the character and situation of the lands" or, for each jurisdiction, 38 "the circumstances of this country." The evidence required allowed for "the 39 situation of the parties, the size and extent of the land, and the purpose for which it is adapted" or "for such purposes as it is capable." 40 41
Even occupancy had to be clarified as that which was "an occupancy . . . according to its adaptation to use." The focus of inquiry was on "acts," which 42 could not be "doubtful and equivocal in their character," to create possession. 43 Actual possession required "subjecting it to the will and dominion of the occupant" and therefore was "evidenced by those things which are essential to its beneficial use." As a result, " 48. It may be that mapping and surveying arose, to some degree, to serve this desire to achieve some measure of a natural holding of land. As Susan Sontag explained, to photograph is to reduce to the literally, physically possessable. See SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 4 (2001) .
Notably, conserved areas may be subject to a wide range of intensive human interventions such as those designed to control invasive species or suppress fires. The distinction may fall, more accurately, between economically productive or extractive land uses such as manufacturing and development, which are valorized by the larger culture, and non-productive or non-yielding land uses, which tend to be derogated by culture, or at best not widely validated.
49. For example, as Thomas Merrill argues, in the context of adverse possession, even while good faith should logically be irrelevant to a determination of adverse possession, courts tend to find a way to prevent bad faith adverse possession. Thomas Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 25, at 190-91. Merrill argues that courts cannot resist "manipulating" the standard elements of an adverse possession claim to make sure that a bad faith possessor is punished-and to deter others from similar behavior. Id. at 196. are those of cultivation, manufacture and development." Indeed some theories, 50 such as Scrope's elaboration of Blackstone's original theory, suggest that possession is not valid as a property claim unless there is "full and complete utilization" of the property. Epstein also pointed to this problem, when he 51 criticized first possession theories of property as circular, arguing that "[t]he labor theory is called upon to aid the theory that possession is the root of title; yet it depends for its own success upon the proposition that the possession of self is the root of title to self." 52 Blackstone worried that "we seem afraid to look back to the means by which [property] was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title." I believe this 53 unwillingness to look too closely stems, in part, from the fact that when it comes to real property, possession is imaginative or metaphorical.
This metaphorical nature of possession, particularly when unrecognized, distorts our attempts to theorize property. Assuming a literal meaning of possession has added false legitimacy to the Lockean labor theory through a correlated confound. Failing to recognize the metaphorical nature of our concepts of possession, we have elevated labor by using it as a proxy repeatedly. Indeed, we have focused on labor far more than Locke ever would have.
III. LOCKE'S PROVISO & CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS
Locke's theory of labor voiced the concerns of his predecessors, such as Gerard Malynes, who in 1622 asked, "Who would till the ground if he hoped not to taste of the crop of it? Surely all would be waste and desolate, if men were to plant and build for everybody, that is nobody." Security of the investment 54 encouraged labor.
55
The bad faith/adverse possession problem demonstrates that as much as property theory may revolve around possession, possession fails to fully explain how courts adjudicate disputes over rightful ownership. Even when faced with indisputable statutory requirements, courts balk at the primacy of mere possession.
Agreeing with Merrill's conclusion that courts refuse to allow title to transfer when there is bad faith, I would argue that this social ordering by the courts represents our association of bad faith dispossession of property with acts of violence. While there are many reasons we apply legal rules to allow adverse possession, to allow it in bad faith would be to undercut the very reason we protect private property: to deter flagrant dispossession and its concomitant violent acts. As the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed, the common law always views adverse possession as an "act of force." Jackson, 30 U.S. at 438. This is something the courts must treat carefully as any system of property has a very limited ability to promote the use of force for removal. inequalities and prime a society for potentially violent conflicts. Unfortunately, while no one seems to dispute Locke's limitation of his labor theory to conditions of surplus, Locke's proviso has been treated as no longer relevant-as merely a part of the creation story. Locke's limitation is indeed a 61 part of the creation story, but it is more than a description of scenery. It is a significant limitation on his theory of labor and one that explicitly emphasizes both the social nature of property and the critical role of property in avoiding violence.
Locke reasoned that, "if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure . . . might be the possession of any other." In terms of the origins of rightful possession, Locke explained "at the 62 beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land," but he was obligated to "yet leave enough to Abel ' Contemporaries of Locke emphasized the community focus on property rights, suggesting that individuals should not look to unoccupied lands as immediately available, but rather should look to the community for appropriate division of the lands. Thus, as Thomas Salmon advised, newly discovered land 66 "must not immediately be looked upon as void and waste, so that any person may seize it as his peculiar; but it is lodged in the community prince or state, to whom the adventurers are subject." This attitude reflects a concern that violence is 67 always a possibility where property is concerned. Salmon admonished his readers that "all nations do insist upon their right to these things. Where is there a pearl fishery open to all foreigners? Or who will permit their oysters to be carried off by strangers if they can oppose it?" Pufendorf agreed, arguing that citizens 68 should not "lay hands on what they please nor fix themselves as it were by some right in any spot of waste ground they find among us." 69 Indeed, Locke's contemporaries specifically emphasized the communicative nature of possession, and its ability to mediate claims and prevent unnecessary violence. Sprint, for example, explained that property "is by occupation and possession, which is an outward act of the body, quaffs position pedis, and not an inward act of the mind, which cannot be known to others [,] . . . and an outward act of possession warns others to abstain." In this formulation, labor is less 70 linked to its purpose of "reward[ing] work and investment" and is more linked 71 to its role of preventing violence. Humans are, notably, inclined to violence to protect their investments, particularly when those investments are necessary for basic sustenance.
The Lockean approach to labor of awarding labor pride of place by allowing it to give legitimacy to private property, which is taken from a previously communal system, suggests that the private property owner should be, in all ways, privileged against the community over this particular piece of real property. The Lockean labor approach does more than privilege labor; it 72 deemphasizes the community's continuing claims to land, or at least to input into 65. See generally 2 LOCKE, supra note 56. Preventing violence was recognized as a cornerstone purpose of property rights. Pufendorf, for example, wrote that the purposes of property are "[1] that thereby the quarrels arising from the original community of ownership are avoided, and [2] that the industry of man is increased." SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET of social relations than a theory of property that centers on dispossession and, therefore, would maintain the importance of the community by recognizing the continually mediating role of property.
74
Additionally, although modern theories have privileged labor, economic utility does not effectively explain how Anglo-American law has treated ownership claims. Land claims have not been favored solely because they maximized productivity, which indicates that we have treated labor as meaningful, but apparently not meaningful enough to maximize productivity. 75 If labor is reconsidered from the perspective of dispossession, acknowledging minimal labor investments makes sense. In a context of reasonably abundant land, a person who entered onto real property only two weeks ago and barely settled himself is far less likely to be violent in enforcing his property claim, as compared to someone who has been on real property for years. Labor matters because labor directly correlates with an increased likelihood of violence from property claims.
IV. EXPLANATORY POWERS OF REORIENTING TO DISPOSSESSION

A. Exclusive Possession as a Foundational Value
While we talk a great deal about stories of first possession, the truth is that we are not quite so much obsessed with possession as we are obsessed with labor. Natural preferences for first possession are not natural preferences for a position in line, but instead for the investment of labor and connection to sustenance (ideas we have rarely separated very well from possession). More importantly, labor matters instinctively not because of some need to value investments but because labor directly correlates with an increased likelihood of violence arising from property claims.
The more one works upon the land, the more likely the person is to protect the investment, and such behavior is probably evolutionarily favorable. Some notion of property plays a central role in all societies by paving the way for provision for the basic human needs of sustenance. This link is evident in 76 ancient Roman policy and tradition, which provided that a man might claim public lands, but only "as much . Western contexts, with more families shopping at the grocery store than growing food on the farm, it is easy to lose sight of the traditional link between survival and the use of violence to maintain one's cultivations. The link to sustenance is 80 also visible in Blackstone's discussion of violent biblical conflicts involving possession of wells, which are closely linked with survival, particularly in the arid climates.
81
As Waldron and Bentham both noted, people simply do not deal well with others taking away something that they have invested in, and thus believe is rightfully "theirs." The sentiment is summarized in the American Revolutionary 82 belief that "a man is a slave if his property can be taken without his consent." 83 The fear of having the fruits of one's labor confiscated is the kind of thing to raise the spirit of violence. As Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, "A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it." Property is 80. We rarely see such a link between survival and land, except as noted in the work of some modern poverty scholars who are re-introducing the link between land and poverty. By reconsidering labor in terms of the psychological dynamics of investment rather than maximization of economic utility, one connects directly with physical property's traditional role as a baseline for survival in pre-industrial societies. Property is, as Ely wrote, "the guardian of every other right." Property takes this 90 unique role because it is a non-violence mediator that establishes a basis for stability, for food security, and peace. Within pre-industrial societies, when relatively little land had been removed from forestation and prepared for cultivation, labor on the land was all the more significant because "the improvement of labor [made] the far greater part of the value." 91 Displacing labor as the primary justification for first possession rules allows us to recognize that labor is subordinate to managing social conflict. Labor 92 underpins feelings of fairness, and underlines why first possessors are likely to fight for their territorial claims. Additionally, labor introduces physical changes 93 onto the land, making visible an occupier's territorial claim. Given the state of the technology of surveying and mapping prior to the nineteenth century, as well as the availability and keeping of records, such visibility was absolutely crucial for providing notification of claims to passersby. soundly regarded as the central feature of property that social scientists tend to define property as theory which "determines exclusive rights." 96 The right of exclusive possession is "the bedrock of English land law," and 97 a chief import of American property law. In developing legal theory for the new government of the United States, James Madison believed that property entailed "dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual."
Madison's theory strongly 98 reflects the influence of Roman law, which had as its central concept the idea of dominium, or the right to full control and to exclude others, and viewed 99 possession specifically in terms of sole access. Madison's choice is 100 unsurprising, given that during the colonial era British reliance on Roman law increased because these principles were "legal resources that had some efficacy within the broader supranational community." Property in the newly colonized 101 America succeeded through the denouncing of more communal tribal claims in favor of the fences and single residences of the colonists.
102
The U.S. Supreme Court has followed Madison's approach, finding that the right to exclude is a "fundamental element of the property right." Theorists J.E.
violence. And humans want ways to avoid violence. Like other primates we prefer not to be violent. Excluding others from the property that we are willing 106 to fight to protect is a method of securing non-violence. And it was this exclusivity that Blackstone seemed to believe so captured the hearts of men.
107
The first part of Blackstone's sentence is often quoted without the clarifying remainder, which emphasizes "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."
108
B. Reconciling Economics and Communication through the Lens of Dispossession
Consider, for example, Carol Rose's approach. In a 1988 essay, Rose focused on the "hard-edged" doctrines that we tend to prefer in property law. She acknowledged that economics suggest the more important something is, the more inclined we are toward hard and fast rules, but she also argued that " 107. "There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property." 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 2. Bentham's view of property as primarily directed toward wealth and prosperity. but her approach leaves us wanting with its deeply economic approach, which orients her view of social relations primarily toward issues of efficiency and wealth. Refocusing on dispossession/non-violence adopts Rose's insights about the importance of the particular labor of communicating one's territorial claim while offering a better explanation for the primacy of first possession rules than an investment-based economic approach. Refocusing on dispossession doesn't mean removing economic approaches from the equation. But it does highlight some of the failings of traditional investment-based approaches. First, an approach that privileges an investmentbased economic view of labor and communication fails to satisfy our sense that first possession rules need an explanatory, perhaps even moral, story. Second, 127 law and economics approaches have favored the rule of first possession, arguing for the rule's efficacy in rewarding labor and promoting active use of resources.
128
Although many of these arguments may support the idea that a rule of first possession was advantageous, it is difficult to imagine that such ideas were instrumental in establishing such a regime in the first instance in a small society with a limited population and no shortage of land. Those criticisms aside, 129 however, economic analyses are likely to be consistent with a non-violence or dispossession-based approach to thinking about why labor matters.
An economic argument could be applied to show the value of any rule of property that favored non-violence and avoided the waste of repeated conflicts and property disputes.
Thus 130. Admittedly, such sophisticated analyses were not unknown in early civilizations. The early Roman system of property gave signs of a systematic design that maximized the utility of land through time and across regions. See Gardiner, supra note 12, at 124. Yet, Roman law allowed the individual landowner to choose to allow his land to remain waste without penalty. See BRIAN P. OWENSBY, EMPIRE OF LAW AND INDIAN JUSTICE IN COLONIAL MEXICO 94 (2008) (explaining the Roman approach while comparing and contrasting notions of possession of pre-conquest indigenous societies and the Spanish crown). However, with the fall of Rome, these insights were largely lost as other legal systems developed. Few were recovered until they influenced the development of civil law many centuries later. See Gardiner, supra note 12, at 125. would be destroyed. In this formulation, both primarily exist-indeed co-136 exist-to manage social conflict.
137
In a community with a low population, with more land readily available, a rule of first possession based on rightful continued possession would have fostered peaceful relations and possibly an even greater likelihood of overall survival. If, then, as Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed suggest, property is the result of a "collective decision," the decision might be less consent to the 138 notion of private property in and of itself, and more one of consent to the concept as a method of achieving another end: non-violence. Richard Epstein's account of the origins of property rights is consistent with this account as well. Epstein argued that in pre-history, rights of first possession prevailed, but then suffered because of encroachments against these accepted rights of ownership. Epstein argued that people created governments precisely 139 because they found that such institutions were necessary to keep private property rights secure from would-be violators. Although Epstein's argument moves 140 swiftly beyond the first possession rule to the implications for later governmental infringement on property rights, his historical account emphasizes the critical problem at the point of property right origins: the hostilities that resulted when one person entered upon land occupied by another and claimed the fruits of the other's labors. Although Epstein may be correct that government was necessary 141 to enforce a system of first possession ownership, his account is compatible with an understanding of the origins of first possession rules in a system of social relationships structuring itself to prevent violence-just as his next evolutionary step of government suggests.
142
A focus on non-violence and dispossession also explains the intuitive and cross-cultural appeal of first possession rules. Scholars such as Sugden argue that there are natural impulses to respect first possession. Sugden describes: 143 Another car is approaching the bridge from the other side. It reaches the bridge before you do and begins to cross. Do you stop and allow the other car to cross, or continue on in the expectation that the other driver will see you coming and reverse? My observation is that most drivers recognize a convention that the first car on the bridge has the right of way. others, as an instinct it may also reflect our desire to avoid conflict, particularly conflicts that may escalate to violence.
CONCLUSION
Wesley Hohfeld re-conceptualized property rights in the twentieth century by arguing that the central function of property was not to order the relationship between an individual and an area of land, but rather to order social relationships. Similarly, Singer, Munzer, and Rose reformulated property 145 146 147 148 as a set of social relations. Harold Demsetz described property rights as:
[I]nstrument[s] of society [that] derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others. These expectations find expression in laws, customs and mores of a society. 149 In many ways, there is nothing new about the social relations approach to property. Blackstone's famous formulation of our affection for property contains words that belie the social nature of property-words such as hold, dominate, and control. 150 Yet, despite our willingness to understand property in terms of social relations, our emphasis on possession has continually obscured the social relations of property in favor of the individual's private claim. Courts may in passing note that property manages social relationships, but in practice courts focus on possession and individual rights, rather than limiting private rights in favor of the greater good of the community. The result is that whenever communities push back against private rights by attempting, for example, to regulate land uses more stringently, the community effectively faces a serious uphill battle.
The courts have focused on possession, which they operationalized as an investment-based approach to labor. This approach diverges from the thinking of the many theorists who supported a labor approach during our founding era-theorists who would have thought of labor not just in terms of investment, but also in terms of managing human conflict.
Thinking of labor in terms of investment rather than in terms of what a person is willing to go to arms over undermines the critical role of property in maintaining peaceful social arrangements. Thinking about labor in terms of nonviolence rather than just investments, and thinking about dispossession rather than possession reframes our rhetoric and recovers the social function of property as a mediator with the ability to prevent violence. Similarly, such a reformulation opens us to recognizing how, in Rousseau's formulation, a property regime may, particularly over the long-term, generate inequality through the right to exclude. Recognizing that labor and vested 151 interests must, at a point, yield to the need to mediate and stabilize, legal systems could acknowledge a point at which inequality becomes so pervasive that our protection of property owners, particularly against externalities of other land uses, must change to accommodate social well-being.
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